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Abstract  10 
Group-level cooperation often poses a social dilemma in which joint action may be difficult to achieve. 11 
Theoretical models and experimental work on humans show that social incentives, such as punishment 12 
of defectors and rewarding of cooperators, can promote cooperation in groups of unrelated individuals. 13 
Here, we demonstrate that these processes can operate in a non-human animal species, and be used to 14 
effectively promote the production of a public good. We took advantage of the fact that intergroup 15 
fights in vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops pygerythrus) are characterised by episodes of intergroup 16 
aggression with pauses in-between. During pauses, females selectively groomed males that had 17 
participated in the previous aggressive episode, but aggressed male group members that had not. In 18 
subsequent (i.e. future) episodes, males who had received either aggression or grooming participated 19 
above their personal base-line level. Therefore, female-male aggression and grooming both appear to 20 
function as social incentives that effectively promote male participation in intergroup fights. 21 
Importantly, females stood to gain much from recruiting males as the probability of winning intergroup 22 
fights was dependent on the number of active participants, relative to the number of fighters in the 23 
opposing group. Furthermore, females appear to maximise the benefits gained from recruiting males as 24 
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they primarily used social incentives where and when high-quality food resources, which are the 25 
resources primarily limiting to female fitness, were at stake. 26 
 27 
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1. Introduction 32 
Helping among unrelated individuals has attracted major research efforts among evolutionarily minded 33 
scientists as it has to be reconciled with a theory that strongly emphasises competition [1-7]. In group-34 
living species, actions like predator vigilance, cooperative hunting, or the defence of territories often 35 
produce a public good, where individuals that do not contribute receive greater payoffs than those that 36 
do. The former are called free-riders or defectors while the latter are called cooperators. Thus, group-37 
level cooperation often poses a social dilemma in which cooperators, who contribute to the production 38 
of the public good, are vulnerable to exploitation by their free-riding group members [3]. Such dilemmas 39 
are often modelled as an n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the self-serving decision of individual 40 
group members is to defect, even if this does not result in the maximum possible pay-off at the level of 41 
the group [8, 9]. However, many social dilemmas in nature may better fit the framework of a 42 
Volunteer’s Dilemma (an n-player Snowdrift), in which individuals still prefer to free-ride, unless not 43 
enough cooperators are present to secure the production of the public good, in which case cooperation 44 
becomes the self-serving strategy (despite a certain degree of exploitation) [10, 11]. Besides such 45 
negative frequency dependencies in a Volunteer’s Dilemmas, spatial population structure and social 46 
incentives can also favour contributions to public goods based on direct fitness benefits [12-17]. For 47 
example, public goods experiments conducted on humans in a laboratory setting show that social 48 
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incentives like the punishment of defectors and rewarding of cooperators can effectively promote 49 
cooperative behaviour [18, 19]. 50 
  51 
One of the riskiest joint actions that humans engage in is warfare, and social incentives are 52 
thought to have been important in promoting the participation (i.e. cooperation) of male warriors  in 53 
primitive warfare [16, 20, 21]. The majority of animal species, however, do not engage in warfare [22, 54 
23] but group members still cooperatively defend a territory, or parts of their home range. Cooperative 55 
intergroup aggression in non-warring animals is nevertheless a high-risk activity, potentially resulting in 56 
injury or death [24-29], and is prone to social dilemmas (e.g. the collective action problem [3, 30-33]). 57 
Unlike in humans, there is little empirical evidence that animals use social incentives to manipulate the 58 
participation of their group members and overcome social dilemmas during intergroup fights. In fact, 59 
studies clearly demonstrating that non-human animals use punishment or rewards to manipulate the 60 
cooperative behaviour of conspecifics in any context are remarkably limited [34, 35]. 61 
 62 
We conducted a field study of intergroup aggression in vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops 63 
pygerythrus), a species in which both sexes participate aggressively during intergroup fights, even 64 
though males are approximately 1.5 times larger than females [36, 37]. Patterns of intergroup 65 
aggression in this species follow the predictions of the Volunteer’s Dilemma, in which the payoffs of 66 
home range defence are non-linear [10, 11]. That is to say, production of the public good (i.e. home 67 
range defence) does not increase linearly with the number of participants, rather a certain number of 68 
volunteers are required to successfully secure the public good [10, 11]. In vervet monkeys, typically only 69 
a small proportion of group members participate in a given intergroup fight, and although individual 70 
participation is highly variable, the average number of individuals who participate in intergroup fights is 71 
similar among groups [17]. Given that defending access to food resources can have significant fitness 72 
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benefits for female primates [38-42], females likely have a strong incentive to participate in intergroup 73 
fights when valuable food resources are at stake. Furthermore, because they are the philopatric sex, 74 
female vervet monkeys stand to gain long-term direct and indirect fitness benefits from effective home 75 
range defence [25, 43]. However, high-ranking females are more likely to participate in intergroup fights 76 
and low-ranking individuals are more likely to free-ride on the efforts of others [17, 36], which suggests 77 
that those who have priority of access to defended resources are those most likely to volunteer. Male 78 
vervet monkeys migrate repeatedly during their lives, residing in a group for a few months or a few 79 
years. Because food is not a key resource limiting male fitness, males are not expected to contribute to 80 
food defence [44]. Instead, male vervet monkeys participate in intergroup fights for one of two benefits 81 
[37]. First, males who are likely to have sired offspring react defensively when members of the opposing 82 
group are highly aggressive, such that offspring may be at risk [37]. Second, males also support females 83 
in instigating intergroup aggression, however, this primarily occurs during the mating season when 84 
doing so is associated with higher mating success [37]. As a result, females may receive little support 85 
from their larger-bodied male group members for much of the year, including much of the summer 86 
season when high-quality food resources are at stake. If recruiting more active participants increases the 87 
likelihood of winning access to food resources, females potentially have a strong incentive to manipulate 88 
the participation of male group members to increase the fighting ability of their group. In social species, 89 
competitive ability is typically thought to increase with group size [29, 41] but numerous studies have 90 
shown that smaller groups frequently win intergroup fights [38, 45-48]. When individual participation is 91 
highly variable, larger groups can suffer defeat if defection among group members is high [46, 49]. 92 
Therefore, the relative number of active participants, rather than relative group size, may determine the 93 
outcome of intergroup fights [48]. Given that only a proportion of group members typically participate 94 
in a given intergroup fight and individual participation is highly variable in vervet monkeys [17, 36, 37], it 95 
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is very likely that the relative number of active participants determines who wins intergroup fights in 96 
this species. 97 
 98 
 Intergroup fights were comprised of discrete episodes of intergroup aggression, with periods of 99 
calm in-between. Typically, aggressive episodes consisted of one or more individuals running towards 100 
the opposing group while making aggressive vocalisations, or chasing an individual from the opposing 101 
group. During calm periods, or pauses, in which the two groups were in close proximity but not 102 
interacting, we observed female actors directing social behaviours towards adult males from their own 103 
group. These social behaviours could be either affiliative (i.e. grooming) or aggressive; female-male 104 
aggression (FM-agg) typically started with female actor(s) vocalising and making a threatening display 105 
towards a target male who was within a couple of meters. These displays often escalated into a chase, 106 
and in a couple of instances the female actors physically attacked the target male. These social 107 
behaviours typically occurred when the actor and target were near the front-line, monitoring the 108 
opposing group. Thus, FM-agg and female-male grooming (FM-gr) appear to relate directly to the 109 
context of the intergroup fight rather than an alternative context such as feeding. Here, we investigate 110 
whether these social behaviours potentially function as social incentives, used by females to manipulate 111 
the participation of male group members in future aggressive episodes. 112 
 113 
To ascertain if FM-agg and FM-gr function as social incentives, we first test if females benefit 114 
from manipulating male participation in intergroup fights by examining the effect that the number of 115 
aggressive participants had on the odds of winning. Then, we investigate the spatio-temporal variability 116 
in the occurrence of these social behaviours. If females use aggression and grooming to manipulate 117 
males in defending resources that limit female fitness, females should be more likely to exhibit these 118 
behaviours during time periods, and in locations where valuable food resources are at stake. Lastly, we 119 
6 
 
test if FM-agg functions as punishment for defection, and if FM-gr functions as a reward for 120 
participation. If this is the case, females who attempt to solicit male support should direct aggression 121 
towards males who did not participate in the most recent aggressive episode, but groom males who did. 122 
Furthermore, males who receive FM-agg should become more likely to participate in subsequent 123 
aggressive episodes [50], and males who receive FM-gr should maintain elevated levels of participation.  124 
 125 
 126 
2. Materials and methods 127 
(a) Subjects and study site  128 
Data were collected on 4 habituated groups of vervet monkeys at the Mawana Game Reserve (28°00’S, 129 
31°12’E), South Africa, with all data collection protocols approved by the appropriate local authority, the 130 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife Board. Vervet monkeys live in multi-male multi-female groups, in which females 131 
are the philopatric sex and males emigrate multiple times throughout their adult lives. At this study site, 132 
groups consisted of 1 to 7 males and 5 to 14 females. All animals in the 4 focal groups were individually 133 
recognised, as were most of the adults in the neighbouring and frequently encountered groups.  134 
 135 
(b) Behavioural data  136 
We conducted one to two days of observational data collection on each group, each week, for a total of 137 
>11000 observation hours during the study period (January 2012 and February 2014). On these days we 138 
performed group scans every 30 minutes, and also recorded all observed social interactions (i.e. all-139 
occurrence data). For each social interaction, we recorded the context (e.g. feeding, social), actor and 140 
recipient, and whether the actor received support from any group members.  141 
 142 
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Participation during intergroup encounters was also collected on an all-occurrence basis and 143 
encounters were deemed intergroup fights when one or more individuals from either group exhibited 144 
intergroup aggression. During aggressive episodes, participants could direct intergroup aggression 145 
towards the opposing group as a whole (e.g. run towards the group making aggressive vocalisations), or 146 
aggress specific individuals (e.g. chase, grab or bite a member of the opposing group). Throughout each 147 
intergroup fight, we recorded the time that each aggressive episode was initiated, the identity of active 148 
individuals, behaviour(s) exhibited, and the identity of the individuals intergroup aggression was 149 
directed towards. We recorded the same information when there was a social interaction within the 150 
group. One group was deemed to have won an intergroup encounter if they displaced the opposing 151 
group from the contested location. When the 2 groups tolerated each other until one group left the 152 
area, the encounter was categorised as having no clear winner (i.e. a draw).  153 
 154 
We used this dataset to determine if targeted males had participated in the last aggressive 155 
episode prior to, as well as the next aggressive episode following FM-agg or FM-gr. However, we 156 
observed both FM-agg and FM-gr before any intergroup aggression had been exhibited (n = 22), in the 157 
middle of intergroup fights (n = 39), as well as just before the opposing group retreated and the 158 
intergroup fight ended (n = 10). Additionally, there were cases where the participants of aggressive 159 
episodes, female actors, or male targets, were not identified (although their age class/sex was 160 
determined). Therefore, our analyses were typically based on a subset of data in which an aggressive 161 
episode had occurred (before or after the social incentive, depending on the analysis) and the identity 162 
and behaviour of the relevant actors/targets/participants was known. We report the sample size that 163 
each analysis was based on.  164 
 165 
(c) Statistical analyses  166 
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To examine the spatio-temporal variability in the occurrence of FM-agg and FM-gr, we used a 167 
generalised linear mixed model (GLMM), in which the dependent variable was whether or not either of 168 
these social incentives were observed in a given intergroup encounter. We set group as a random effect, 169 
a binomial error structure and a logit link function, and included 4 fixed effects. The 3 seasonal fixed 170 
effects included were the birth season (October to December), the summer season (November to May), 171 
and the mating season (April to July). The birth season was indexed by the number of small infants (less 172 
than 3 months old) in the group, and the summer season was indexed using monthly average 173 
normalised difference vegetation index values (NDVI), which correlates with field measurements of food 174 
availability and shelter in vervet monkeys [51](See Electronic Supplementary Material for further detail). 175 
To account for the spatial variability in food resources, the last fixed effect we included in the GLMM 176 
was the relative availability of fruits in the area in which the intergroup fight took place, compared to 177 
what was available in the rest of the home range (See Electronic Supplementary Material for further 178 
detail). 179 
 180 
A Fisher’s exact test was used to test if when using social incentives, females directed aggression 181 
towards males who had recently defected and grooming towards males who had recently participated. 182 
We then examined the effect that FM-agg and FM-gr subsequently had on the cooperative behaviour of 183 
males both at the population level, and the individual level.  At the population level, all observations of 184 
punishment (or rewards) were pooled and the identity of the target male was not considered; at the 185 
individual level, the propensity to participate before versus after receiving punishment (or rewards) was 186 
determined for each male in the population. The former was tested using a Chi-squared test, and the 187 
latter using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test.  We further examined the effect that social incentives had on 188 
male participation by comparing the proportion of aggressive episodes in which males participated 189 
following FM-agg (or FM-gr), to their individual base-line level of participation (i.e. the proportion of 190 
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episodes participated in during intergroup fights in which social incentives were observed, but they were 191 
not the male targeted). We used a Chi-squared test to determine if groups with more active individuals 192 
were more likely to win intergroup fights, as well as if males were more likely to be the target of female 193 
aggression (and female grooming) during intergroup fights than in other contexts. 194 
 195 
In order to assess the magnitude of effects for all of our analyses [52, 53], we present the 196 
appropriate effect size statistics: odds ratio with Chi-squared tests, r with Wilcoxon signed rank tests and 197 
R2GLMM(c) in our GLMM [54, 55]. The overall significance of the GLMM model was assessed by comparing 198 
the final model to the null model (model including intercept and random effect only) using a likelihood 199 
ratio test. In all analyses, α was set at 0.05, but we also discuss non-significant trends (0.05 < p < 0.10) 200 
when they are biologically interesting. All statistical analyses were conducted in R [version 3.0.3, 56] and 201 
we used the lme4 package [version 1.1-4, 57] to fit the GLMM model. 202 
 203 
 204 
3. Results 205 
During more than 2 years of observation of 4 habituated groups of vervet monkeys, we observed more 206 
than 400 intergroup encounters, approximately half of which (n = 236) escalated into an intergroup 207 
fight. Intergroup fights were 45 minutes long on average, but could be extremely brief or last up to 8 208 
hours (mean ± SD = 45 ± 55 min., range = 1 to 475 min.). A third of intergroup fights consisted of a single 209 
episode of intergroup aggression, but the majority of intergroup fights were prolonged, consisting of 210 
multiple aggressive episodes (mean ± SD = 4.6 ± 3.0 episodes; range = 0 (only the opposing group 211 
exhibited intergroup aggression) to 15 episodes) that were typically spaced 3 to 4 minutes apart. 212 
However, when neither group was able to displace the other, the 2 groups often gave up fighting and 213 
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tolerated each other nearby. In such situations, the pause between aggressive episodes could last up to 214 
3 hours before members of either group re-initiated an intergroup fight.  215 
It was typically only a small proportion of group members that participated in each aggressive 216 
episode, with the average number of active males being 0.7 (SD = 0.7; range = 0 to 3), and the average 217 
number of female participants being 1.4 (SD = 1.5; range = 0 to 7). Thus, male support was absent in 218 
approximately half of the observed aggressive episodes, and it was rare that there was more than one 219 
male active at the front-line (fewer than 10% of aggressive episodes). We observed significant inter-220 
individual variability in male participation (in intergroup fights where no FM-agg or FM-gr were 221 
observed), with some males never being observed participating, and the most active males in ~55% of 222 
the episodes they experienced (mean ± SD = 22 ± 17%; figure 1).  223 
 224 
(a) Benefits of recruiting males 225 
The number of adult participants varied greatly among intergroup fights; in some cases no group 226 
members exhibited intergroup aggression (i.e. the group avoided or fled from a confrontation), while in 227 
other intergroup fights, up to 60% of adults were active participants.  As would be expected when 228 
individual participation is so highly variable, it was the relative number of active participants throughout 229 
the intergroup fight that determined which group was able to displace the other from the contested 230 
location. The odds ratio indicates that groups that mustered more aggressive participants were 14 times 231 
more likely to win an intergroup fight than those with fewer (Chi-squared test: χ2 = 26.900, df = 1, p < 232 
0.001). As a result, smaller groups were able to defeat larger groups during 41% of the intergroup fights 233 
they experienced.  234 
 235 
(b) Spatio-temporal variability in the occurrence of FM-agg and FM-gr 236 
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We examined the spatio-temporal variability in the occurrence of FM-agg and FM-gr, and found that 237 
females were more likely to exhibit these behaviours in both the season when, and locations where 238 
high-quality food resources were available. Seasonal patterns of food availability were indexed using 239 
monthly NDVI values derived from satellite images of the study site, while the spatial distribution of 240 
food was calculated by mapping the distribution of important tree species throughout the study site, 241 
and monitoring the monthly availability of fruits on these tree species (See Electronic Supplementary 242 
Material). Social incentives were more commonly observed in the summer months (GLMM: b ± SE = 243 
5.253 ± 1.819, z = 2.888, p = 0.004; table S1), when tree species important in the diet of the monkeys 244 
were fruiting [51], and in areas of their home range that currently had the highest availability of fruits (b 245 
± SE = 2.326 ± 0.953, z = 2.441, p = 0.015; table S1). Thus, females were most likely to bestow social 246 
incentives in situations where and when valuable food resources were at stake. 247 
 248 
(c) Actors and targets of FM-agg and FM-gr 249 
Both putative punishment (FM-agg) and putative rewards (FM-gr) were rare events, with only 36 cases 250 
of the former and 35 cases of the latter observed throughout hundreds of intergroup encounters. 251 
Twenty-one females were observed to exhibit FM-agg (10 in Group A, 3 in Group B, 7 in Group C, and 1 252 
in Group D), while seventeen different females were seen using FM-gr during intergroup encounters (6 253 
in Group A, 4 in Group B, 6 in Group C, and 1 in Group D). These actors ranged in rank from the 254 
dominant female to the lowest ranking female in their group. When putative punishment occurred 255 
during intergroup fights, and the actors were known, in 73% of cases it was the female(s) that had 256 
participated in the most recent act of intergroup aggression that exhibited FM-agg; alternatively, in 27% 257 
of cases FM-agg was exhibited by one or more bystanders. Similarly, putative rewards were typically 258 
bestowed soon after an aggressive episode (mean ± SD = 4.7 ± 4.6 min.) and the females that exhibited 259 
FM-gr were usually those who had participated in it (78% of cases). Although females sometimes acted 260 
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alone, in 68% of cases FM-agg was exhibited by a coalition of females and/or juveniles (up to 4 261 
individuals). Females who groomed male group members almost always did so alone.    262 
     263 
We observed females directing putative punishment and rewards at a number of different 264 
males (FM-agg: 5 males in Group A, 2 in Group B, 5 in Group C, and at least one male in Group D; FM-gr: 265 
6 males in Group A, 3 in Group B, 5 in Group C, and at least one male in Group D), and these targets 266 
could be either dominant or low-ranking males. When females utilised social incentives during 267 
intergroup fights, female actors were significantly more likely to use aggression when the target male 268 
had recently defected from participation, but use grooming with males who had recently participated 269 
(Fisher’s exact test: p < 0.001; figures 2a and 3a). Males who were groomed by female group members 270 
had participated in the most recent act of intergroup aggression in 16 out of 23 (70%) of the observed 271 
cases (figure 3a). Conversely, males who received FM-agg had not participated in the most recent 272 
aggressive episode in 20 out of 24 (83%) of the observed cases (figure 2a). Furthermore, in 2 of the 273 
remaining 24 cases, the target male had recently participated but had begun to retreat from the front-274 
line; thus, it is possible that females also perceived these retreating males as defecting. Notably, 3 males 275 
that were never observed to receive FM-gr were those that were rarely present near the front-line and 276 
were never observed to participate in intergroup fights in the absence of social incentives (figure 1). 277 
Conversely, 2 males that were never observed receiving FM-agg were the 2 males in the population who 278 
were the most active in intergroup fights (participated in ~55% of aggressive episodes; figure 1).  279 
 280 
When the targets of female social behaviours are compared among contexts, we find that 281 
females were significantly more likely to target males, as opposed to females or juveniles, during 282 
intergroup fights than in other contexts. During intergroup fights, 36 out of the 41 observed cases (88%) 283 
of female aggression targeted males; conversely, in other contexts, females directed only 65 out of 360 284 
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observed acts of aggression (18%) towards male group members (Chi-squared test: χ2 = 95.032, df = 1, p 285 
< 0.001). During intergroup fights, 36 out of the 247 observed cases of female grooming (15%) targeted 286 
males; in other contexts, females directed 202 out of 2284 grooming events (9%) towards males (χ2 = 287 
8.592, df = 1, p = 0.003). While the odds ratio indicates that females were 2 times more likely to direct 288 
grooming towards male group members during intergroup fights, female aggression was almost 289 
exclusively directed towards males (odds ratio = 33 times as likely to aggress males than females or 290 
juveniles). 291 
 292 
(d) Target behaviour following FM-agg and FM-gr 293 
We analysed the effect that social incentives had on subsequent male participation, both at the 294 
population level and the individual level. At the population level, all observations of FM-agg (or FM-gr) 295 
were pooled and the identity of the target male was not considered. At this level, FM-agg had a strong 296 
impact on the subsequent behaviour of target males; the likelihood ratio indicates that targeted males 297 
were 11 times more likely to participate in the next aggressive episode following FM-agg (71% of cases, 298 
n = 17) than they were to have participated in the most recent episode before being targeted (Chi-299 
squared test: χ2 = 11.53, df = 1, p < 0.001; figure 2a). Many males were only observed receiving FM-agg 300 
on one or two occasions and because there was not always an aggressive episode prior to, or following 301 
putative punishment, we were only able to perform the individual-level analysis on a subsample of 7 of 302 
the 9 males observed to receive FM-agg. Despite the low power associated with this limited sample size, 303 
we nevertheless detected a tendency for individual males to increase their participation following 304 
putative punishment (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: w = 2, n = 7 males, p = 0.093, r = 0.64; figure 2b). The 305 
magnitude of the effect size in the individual analysis suggests that this statistical trend is biologically 306 
meaningful, as does the finding that targets of FM-agg subsequently participated above their base-line 307 
level (i.e. the proportion of episodes participated in when they had not been the male targeted by FM-308 
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agg; Wilcoxon signed ranks test: w = 27, n = 8 males, p = 0.035, r = 0.75; figure 2c). The “future” 309 
aggressive episodes that punished males participated in could be relatively soon (i.e. within 1 min.) or up 310 
to an hour after they received FM-agg (mean ± SD = 14.6 ± 17.7 min.).  311 
 312 
Because FM-gr largely targeted males who had participated in the most recent aggressive 313 
episode, the proportion of target males who participated in the next aggressive episode following 314 
putative rewards (13 out of 20 observed cases; 65%) was not significantly different from the proportion 315 
of target males who participated in the most recent episode (70%; Chi-squared test: χ2 = 0.10, df = 1, p = 316 
0.75; figure 3a). Similarly, at the individual level, target males maintained a relatively high level of 317 
participation following FM-gr (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: w = 13.5, n = 11 males, p = 0.599, r = 0.16; 318 
figure 3b). This propensity to participate following FM-gr was biologically significant, as the targets of 319 
putative rewards subsequently participated at levels significantly higher than their base-line level 320 
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test: w = 36, n = 10 males, p = 0.014, r = 0.77; figure 3c). The future aggressive 321 
episodes in which groomed males participated could occur relatively soon (i.e. within 2 min.) or up to 322 
102 minutes after the reward was bestowed (mean ± SD = 23.8 ± 29.7 min.).   323 
 324 
 325 
4. Discussion 326 
The aim of this study was to determine if female vervet monkeys use the carrot (grooming) and/or the 327 
stick (aggression) to manipulate male participation in intergroup fights when the resources limiting to 328 
female fitness were at stake. We found that females were more likely to direct aggression towards 329 
males that had recently defected, but groom males that had recently participated in the intergroup 330 
fight. Given that males that received either subsequently participated at levels above their personal 331 
base-line, both FM-gr and FM-agg indeed appear to function as social incentives that effectively 332 
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promote male cooperation in this context. Importantly, we observed that smaller groups were able to 333 
win intergroup fights if they mobilised a greater number of aggressive participants, indicating there was 334 
a significant benefit to recruiting male group members. We also found that females were more likely to 335 
use social incentives when the benefits were greatest. That is to say, females used the carrot and the 336 
stick in both the season when, and areas of their home range where, valuable food resources were most 337 
abundant. Together, these findings suggest that successful recruitment using social incentives may be 338 
crucial to success in intergroup fights over fitness-limiting resources, and therefore have significant 339 
effects on the fecundity of females [25, 38-42].  340 
 341 
Because of their larger body and canine size, males are likely the most valuable group members 342 
to recruit during intergroup fights. However, it is perhaps less clear why males should respond to such 343 
relatively low-cost incentives as FM-gr, or the risk of injury from FM-agg, with the relatively high-cost 344 
behaviour of participation in intergroup fights. Two possible explanations are that these low-cost 345 
incentives have consequences for male-female social relationships, and/or that receiving incentives 346 
influences the reputation of the target male with his group members [58-60]. Grooming and tolerance 347 
(i.e. the lack of aggression) are important services exchanged in the formation and maintenance of social 348 
bonds in primates [58-60], and it is possible that punishment and rewards have a disproportionate 349 
impact on male behaviour because these social interactions influence the quality of male-female social 350 
relationships. That is to say, receiving punishment could damage the target male’s social relationship(s), 351 
either with the female actor(s) directly (i.e. experience based) or with other female group members who 352 
observe the social incentive (i.e. reputation or information based). Conversely, receiving rewards could 353 
improve bond strength and potentially signal to other female group members that the target male is a 354 
valuable social partner. Thus, relatively low-cost incentives potentially carry higher-cost consequences in 355 
the long-term, and subsequently impact male fitness (e.g. male mating success). 356 
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 357 
Although both female aggression and grooming were significantly more likely to be directed 358 
towards males (versus females and juveniles) during intergroup encounters than in other contexts, our 359 
data do not allow us to discount the possibility that males were more frequently in close proximity 360 
during these encounters. However, while proximity could potentially influence the propensity to direct 361 
grooming towards male group members, increased proximity cannot explain the overwhelming extent 362 
to which females targeted males when being aggressive. In fact, female intragroup aggression was 363 
almost exclusively directed towards males during intergroup fights, which raises the question of why 364 
females would use punishment primarily on males, rather than also with other females and juveniles. As 365 
males are the largest age-sex class, recruiting males likely has a disproportionate effect on the group’s 366 
fighting ability. Not only does their larger size give them a physical advantage, but their participation in 367 
intergroup aggression appears to decrease the perceived risk of injury for smaller females, as females 368 
are more likely to participate when they have more support from their male group members (Arseneau, 369 
in review). Thus, recruiting males may also encourage more females to join in the fight and further 370 
increase the odds of winning. Moreover, there were also more opportunities to recruit defecting males 371 
as they frequently sat near the front-line without actively participating. Males who were investigating 372 
dispersal opportunities were often present near the front-line so that when the intergroup fight died 373 
down, they could approach and attempt to affiliate with members of the opposing group. Males who 374 
were likely to have sired offspring also often sat near the front-line, monitoring the intergroup fight, 375 
ready to respond defensively when potential offspring were perceived to be at risk [37]. Conversely, 376 
females and juveniles who were not participating in the intergroup fight typically avoided the front-line 377 
and were therefore not potential targets for punishment.  378 
 379 
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Although social incentives were typically observed during the pauses in intergroup fights, in 380 
some cases, they were bestowed when the groups were within visual range but were not interacting. 381 
Upon detecting another group nearby, it was often female group members who began to approach the 382 
opposing group while vocalising to solicit support. When “enough” group members had joined them 383 
(usually within 1 m), they instigated an escalated conflict. Thus, in gearing up for an intergroup fight, it 384 
was often females who took the initiative, and who assessed if they had gathered sufficient willing 385 
participants, or whether they should retreat from a risky confrontation. In this context, FM-agg and FM-386 
gr may function to goad males into supporting females in instigating intergroup fights. Further work is 387 
necessary to determine how the decision to escalate versus retreat is made, and the effect social 388 
incentives have on male behaviour in this context. 389 
 390 
Both FM-agg and FM-gr were typically exhibited by females that had participated in the most 391 
recent aggressive episode (i.e. second parties); however, in a quarter of cases, social incentives were 392 
bestowed by female bystanders. Given the importance of food resources to female fitness [38-42], all 393 
female group members are likely to benefit from forcefully recruiting male group members during 394 
intergroup fights. Thus, cases where punishment and rewards were bestowed by a bystander would 395 
most accurately be described as peer punishment and rewards (as opposed to social incentives provided 396 
by a centralised authority) exhibited by self-serving third parties [34, 61, 62]. In primitive warfare, 397 
punishment and rewards are doled out both by other warriors (second parties) and other group 398 
members who are in many cases, likely to be self-interested third parties [16, 63]; however, there is also 399 
evidence that in larger groups, third parties who do not frequently interact with the target (i.e. 400 
individuals who do not gain significant direct benefits) also use social incentives to promote warrior 401 
participation [21, 64]. Communication can greatly enhance cooperation in social dilemmas [65, 66], as 402 
communication allows group members to gossip about the bravery, or cowardice of warriors. As a 403 
18 
 
result, individuals may behave cooperatively to improve their reputation with their group members [13] 404 
and social incentives are often bestowed by group members who were not present to observe the 405 
participation of warriors directly (e.g. women and senior group members) [16, 21].  406 
 407 
In this study, we were able to capitalise on the fact that intergroup fights in vervets consist of a 408 
number of episodes of intergroup aggression with pauses in-between. As a result, we have been able to 409 
assess if the targets of FM-agg and FM-gr had or had not participated in the most recent cooperative 410 
event, and if these social incentives promoted participation in future cooperative events. With these 411 
data, we demonstrate the first quantitative evidence that both positive and negative social incentives 412 
are used to effectively manipulate male participation in intergroup fights in a species other than our 413 
own. Furthermore, we have strived to describe the social and ecological conditions in which these social 414 
incentives occur, providing unique insight into the real-world conditions under which punishment and 415 
rewards can evolve. We urge other researchers who observe intragroup aggression and/or affiliative 416 
behaviours during (or shortly following) intergroup fights, as well as other cooperative activities, to also 417 
investigate who is the target of these behaviours, and the impact such social interactions have on future 418 
cooperative behaviour. Such investigations are critical to understanding how important social incentives 419 
are to the evolution and maintenance of cooperation in non-human animals.    420 
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Figures 600 
 601 
Figure 1. Typical levels of participation in intergroup fights, calculated as the proportion of aggressive 602 
episodes that each male participated in during intergroup fights in which no social incentives (female-603 
male aggression or female-male grooming) were observed. Each dot represents one male in the 604 
population (n = 20).   605 
 606 
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Figure 2. The proportion of aggressive episodes that targeted males participated in before (light) versus 608 
after (dark) receiving aggression from female group members (a) at the population level, and (b) at the 609 
individual level (note: each dot represents the proportion of aggressive episodes participated in for one 610 
male in the population (n = 9 males); means are portrayed by the white dotted line and medians by the 611 
dark line). (c) The proportion of aggressive episodes targeted males participated in after being aggressed 612 
by a female group member, compared to their base-line level of participation (i.e. proportion of 613 
episodes participated in during intergroup fights where social incentives were observed, but they were 614 
not the male targeted). Significance levels denoted by * (p < 0.05) and *** (p < 0.001).   615 
 616 
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Figure 3. The proportion of aggressive episodes that targeted males participated in before (light) versus 618 
after (dark) receiving grooming from female group members (a) at the population level, and (b) at the 619 
individual level (note: each dot represents the proportion of aggressive episodes participated in for one 620 
male in the population (n = 11 males); means are portrayed by the white dotted line and medians by the 621 
dark line). (c) The proportion of aggressive episodes targeted males participated in after being groomed 622 
by a female group member compared to their base-line level of participation (i.e. proportion of episodes 623 
participated in during intergroup fights where social incentives were observed, but they were not the 624 
male targeted). Significance levels denoted by * (p < 0.05) and *** (p < 0.001).   625 
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